On The Cover/Top Stories
Millionaire Mullahs
Paul Klebnikov, 21.07.2003

A nuclear threat to the rest of the world, Iran is robbing its own people of prosperity. But the men at the top are getting extremely rich.

It''''s rumble time in Tehran. At dozens of intersections in the capital of Iran thousands of students are protesting on a recent Friday around midnight, as they do nearly every night, chanting pro-democracy slogans and lighting bonfires on street corners. Residents of the surrounding middle-class neighborhoods converge in their cars, honking their horns in raucous support.

Suddenly there''''s thunder in the air. A gang of 30 motorcyclists, brandishing iron bars and clubs as big as baseball bats, roars through the stalled traffic. They glare at the drivers, yell threats, thump cars. Burly and bearded, the bikers yank two men from their auto and pummel them. Most protesters scatter. Uniformed policemen watch impassively as the thugs beat the last stragglers.

These Hell''''s Angels are part of the Hezbollah militia, recruited mostly from the countryside. Iran''''s ruling mullahs roll them out whenever they need to intimidate their opponents. The Islamic Republic is a strange dictatorship. As it moves to repress growing opposition to clerical rule, the regime relies not on soldiers or uniformed police (many of whom sympathize with the protesters) but on the bullies of Hezbollah and the equally thuggish Revolutionary Guards. The powers that be claim to derive legitimacy from Allah but remain on top with gangsterlike methods of intimidation, violence and murder.

Who controls today''''''''s Iran? Certainly not Mohammad Khatami, the twice-elected moderate president, or the reformist parliament. Not even the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a stridently anti-American but unremarkable cleric plucked from the religious ranks 14 years ago to fill the shoes of his giant predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, is fully in control. The real power is a handful of clerics and their associates who call the shots behind the curtain and have gotten very rich in the process.

( چه کسی ایران امروز را کنترل می کند؟ مطمئنا این شخص محمد خاتمی کسیکه دوبار به ریاست جمهوری برگزیده شده و حتی آیت الله خامنه ای رهبر ایران نیست. قدرت (اقتصادی و سرمایه داری) واقعی در دستان بعضی روحانیون و اشخاص متصل به آنهاست که در پشت پرده نظام بسیار ثروتمند شده اند )

 The economy bears more than a little resemblance to the crony capitalism that sprouted from the wreck of the Soviet Union. The 1979 revolution expropriated the assets of foreign investors and the nation''''s wealthiest families; oil had long been nationalized, but the mullahs seized virtually everything else of value--banks, hotels, car and chemical companies, makers of drugs and consumer goods. What distinguishes Iran is that many of these assets were given to Islamic charitable foundations, controlled by the clerics. According to businessmen and former foundation executives, the charities now serve as slush funds for the mullahs and their supporters.

Iran has other lethal secrets besides its nuclear program, now the subject of prying international eyes. Dozens of interviews with businessmen, merchants, economists and former ministers and other top government officials reveal a picture of a dictatorship run by a shadow government that--the U.S. State Department suspects--finances terrorist groups abroad through a shadow foreign policy. Its economy is dominated by shadow business empires and its power is protected by a shadow army of enforcers.

Ironically, the man most adept at manipulating this hidden power structure is one of Iran''''s best-known characters--Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who has been named an ayatollah, or religious leader. He was the speaker of parliament and Khomeinis right-hand man in the 1980s, president of Iran from 1989 to 1997 and is now chairman of the powerful Expediency Council, which resolves disputes between the clerical establishment and parliament. Rafsanjani has more or less run the Islamic Republic for the past 24 years.

جالب تر اینکه بزرگترین شخصیت نزدیک به نظام قدرت در ایران ودر عین حال یکی از بزرگترین سرمایه داران ایران  شخصیت سرشناس و معروف٬ آیت الله هاشمی رفسنجانی است که نام آیت الله یا رهبر مذهبی را بر خود دارد.

در دوران ریاست جمهوری وی بود که بازار سهام دوباره زنده شد و شرکتهای دولتی به اعضای داخلی آنها فروخته شد. تجارت خارجی آزاد شد و درهای بخش نفتی ایران به روی شرکتهای خصوصی باز شد. در این زمان بود که اغلب امکانات و قراردادهای پر سود در انحصار روحانیون و اشخاص مرتبط با آنها قرار گرفت که در این میان خود خانواده رفسنجانی از بیشترین این انحصارات و امکانات سود جسته اند. خانواده وی در اصل کشاورزان پسته کار بودند.

"They were not rich people, so they worked hard and always tried to help their relatives get ahead," remembers Reza, a historian who declines to use his last name and who studied with one of  Rafsanjani''''s brothers at Tehran University in the early 1970s. "When they were in university, two brothers earned money on the side tutoring theological students and preparing their exam papers."

Discontent Unveiled Disaffected, denied opportunity and just plain bored, Iran''''s youth have taken their frustrations with the clerics'''' regime to the streets.
	Iran	U.S.
Population	67 million	283 million
Percent under 25	65%	35%
GDP per capita	$1,800	$37,000
Inflation	25%	2%
Unemployment	18%	6%
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; U.S. Department of Labor; Atieh Bahar Consulting; Forbes estimates.

The 1979 revolution transformed the Rafsanjani clan into commercial pashas. One brother headed the country''''s largest copper mine; another took control of the state-owned TV network; a brother-in-law became governor of Kerman province, while a cousin runs an outfit that dominates Iran''''s $400 million pistachio export business; a nephew and one of Rafsanjani''''s sons took key positions in the Ministry of Oil; another son heads the Tehran Metro construction project (an estimated $700 million spent so far). Today, operating through various foundations and front companies, the family is also believed to control one of Iran''''s biggest oil engineering companies, a plant assembling Daewoo automobiles, and Iran''''s best private airline (though the Rafsanjanis insist they do not own these assets).

انقلاب سال 1979 طایفه هاشمی را به پادشاهان تجاری تبدیل کرد. یکی از برادران وی کنترل بزرگترین معدن مس ایران  و دیگری کنترل شبکه رادیو تلویزیونی دولتی را در دست گرفت. باجناق وی فرماندار استان کرمان گردید. یکی از پسرعموهای وی کنترل صادرات 400 میلیون دلاری پسته ایران را در دست دارد. پسر وی بهمراه یکی از برادرزاده ها مسئولیت های کلیدی را در وزارت نفت دارا هستند. یکی دیگر از فرزندان وی مسئول اجرای متروی تهران است که تا کنون 700 میلیون دلار برای این پروژه بودجه صرف شده است. این خانواده همچنین دارای یکی از بزرگترین شرکتهای مهندسی  نفت و صاحب شرکت دوو ایران نیز می باشند. همچنین یکی از بهترین خطوط هواپیمایی ایران نیز متعلق به این خانواده است. البته اعضای این خانواده داشتن این دارئی ها را رد می کنند.

None of this sits well with the populace, whose per capita income is $1,800 a year. The gossip on the street, going well beyond the observable facts, has the Rafsanjanis stashing billions of dollars in bank accounts in Switzerland and Luxembourg; controlling huge swaths of waterfront in Iran''''s free economic zones on the Persian Gulf; and owning whole vacation resorts on the idyllic beaches of Dubai, Goa and Thailand.

عموم مردم ایران که در آمدی در حدود 1800 دلار در سال دارند نمی توانند با این مسائل کنار بیایند. شایعه های موجود در خیابانها و در بین مردم راجع به حسابهای بانکی میلیارد دلاری خانواده رفسنجانی در بانکهای سوییس و لوکزامبورگ به خوبی با حقایق جور در می آید. حقایقی که نشان از مالکیت این خانواده در شهرهای آزاد ساحلی خلیج فارس (کیش٬ چابهار٬ قشم ) و مکانهای توریستی در سواحل دوبی٬ گوا و تایلند می باشد. 

But not much of the criticism makes its way into print. One journalist who dared to investigate Rafsanjani''''s secret dealings and his alleged role in extrajudicial killings of dissidents is now languishing in jail. He''''s lucky. Iranian politics can be deadly. Five years ago Tehran was rocked by murders of journalists and anticorruption activists; some were beheaded, others mutilated.

اما خیلی از نقدهای رفته به خانواده وی امکان چاپ شدن در روزنامه ها را ندارند. به عنوان مثال یکی از روزنامه نگارانی که جرأت تحقیق در این مسائل را داشت هم اکنون زندانی می باشد.

Some of the family''''s wealth is out there for all to see. Rafsanjani''''s youngest son, Yaser, owns a 30-acre horse farm in the super-fashionable Lavasan neighborhood of north Tehran, where land goes for over $4 million an acre. Just where did Yaser get his money? A Belgian-educated businessman, he runs a large export-import firm that includes baby food, bottled water and industrial machinery.

البته بخشهایی از ثروت این خانواده در ملاء عام و در مقابل چشم همگان آشکارا قرار دارد. یاسر جوان ترین پسر هاشمی مالک یک زمین اسب دوانی 30 هکتاری در منطقه شیک لواسان در شمال تهران است که هر هکتار آن 4 میلیون دلار قیمت دارد. او تاجری است که  تحصیلات خود را در بلژیک به اتمام رسانده و شرکت بسیار بزرگی در زمینه واردات صادرات به راه انداخته که غذای بچه و ماشینهای صنعتی را وارد می کند و در زمینه تولید آب معدنی هم فعال است.

Until a few years ago the simplest way to get rich quick was through foreign-currency trades. Easy, if you could get greenbacks at the subsidized import rate of 1,750 rials to the dollar and resell them at the market rate of 8,000 to the dollar. You needed only the right connections for an import license. "I estimate that, over a period of ten years, Iran lost $3 billion to $5 billion annually from this kind of exchange-rate fraud," says Saeed Laylaz, an economist, now with Iran''''s biggest carmaker. "And the lion''''s share of that went to about 50 families."

تا همین چند سال پیش یکی از سریع ترین راه های ثروتمند شدن از طریق معاملات ارزهای خارجی بود. فقط کافی بود از دلار سوبسیدی با نرخ دولتی 1750 ریال که جهت واردات در نظر گرفته شده بود استفاده می کردید و سپس آن دلار را به نرخ 8000 ریال در بازار آزاد به فروش می رساندید. برای این کار شما احتیاج به ارتباطات خاص با اشخاص خاصی داشتید تا به مجوزهای قانونی دست یابید. سعید لیلاز یکی از اقتصاد دانان ایران برآورد می کند که در طی یک دوره ده ساله هر سال حدود 3 تا 5 ملیارد دلار کلاه برداری از درآمد سرانه ملی ایران با روش تقلب در معاملات ارزهای خارجی صورت گرفته است که قسمت عمده درآمد حاصل از این روش به فقط 50 خانواده رسیده است.

One of the families benefiting from the foreign trade system was the Asgaroladis, an old Jewish clan of bazaar traders, who converted to Islam several generations ago. Asadollah Asgaroladi exports pistachios, cumin, dried fruit, shrimp and caviar, and imports sugar and home appliances; his fortune is estimated by Iranian bankers to be some $400 million. Asgaroladi had a little help from his older brother, Habibollah, who, as minister of commerce in the 1980s, was in charge of distributing lucrative foreign-trade licenses. (He was also a counterparty to commodities trader and then-fugitive Marc Rich, who helped Iran bypass U.S.-backed sanctions.)

خانواده عسگر اولادی یکی از خانواده هایی است که از تجارت خارجی سود برده است.

The other side of Iran''''s economy belongs to the Islamic foundations, which account for 10% to 20% of the nation''''s GDP--$115 billion last year. Known as bonyads, the best-known of these outfits were established from seized property and enterprises by order of Ayatollah Khomeini in the first weeks of his regime. Their mission was to redistribute to the impoverished masses the "illegitimate" wealth accumulated before the revolution by "apostates" and "blood-sucking capitalists." And, for a decade or so, the foundations shelled out money to build low-income housing and health clinics. But since Khomeini''''s death in 1989 they have increasingly forsaken their social welfare functions for straightforward commercial activities.

بخش دیگری از اقتصاد ایران متعلق به تشکیلاتی اسلامی است  که 10 تا 20 درصد تولید ناخالص داخلی را در دست دارند. به این تشکیلات بنیاد گفته می شود. عمده این بنیاد ها از طریق گرفتن املاک و اموال ضبط شده در همان هفته های اول انقلاب تشکیل شدند. هدف از ایجاد این بنیاد ها تقسیم ثروتهای انباشته شده توسط افراد مرتد و سرمایه داران خونخوار قبل از انقلاب در میان افراد فقیرتر جامعه بود. البته بمدت حدود یک دهه٬ این بنیادها قسمتی از درآمدهای خود را صرف ساختن مسکن و درمانگاه برای بخشهای محروم جامعه کردند اما بعد از رحلت آیت الله خمینی در سال 1989 این بنیادها از ادامه پرداختن به کارکردهای اینچنینی در زمینه رفاه اجتماعی دست کشیدند و صرفا به فعالیتهای اقتصادی مشغول شدند.

Until recently they were exempt from taxes, import duties and most government regulation. They had access to subsidized foreign currency and low-interest loans from state-owned banks. And they were not accountable to the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance or any other government institution. Formally, they are under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Leader; effectively, they operate without any oversight at all, answerable only to Allah.

تا همین اواخر این بنیادها معاف ازمالیات دولتی٬ مالیات واردات کالا و مالیات مربوط به سایر آیین نامه های دولتی بودند. علاوه بر این آنها به ارز دولتی و وام بانکهای دولتی با بهره کم و به سادگی دسترسی داشته اند. این بنیادها به هیچ وجه در برابر بانک مرکزی٬ وزارت دارائی و یا سایر موسسات دولتی جوابگو نیستند. به صورت رسمی این بنیاد ها فقط زیر نظر رهبری هستند.  

According to Shiite Muslim tradition, devout businessmen are expected to donate 20% of profits to their local mosques, which use the money to help the poor. By contrast, many bonyads seem like straightforward rackets, extorting money from entrepreneurs. Besides the biggest national outfits, almost every Iranian town has its own bonyad, affiliated with local mullahs. "Many small businessmen complain that as soon as you start to make some money, the leading mullah will come to you and ask for a contribution to his local charity," says an opposition economist, who declines to give his name. "If you refuse, you will be accused of not being a good Muslim. Some witnesses will turn up to testify that they heard you insult the Prophet Mohammad, and you will be thrown in jail." The Cosa Nostra meets fundamentalism.

Other charities resemble multinational conglomerates. The Mostazafan & Jambazan Foundation (Foundation for the Oppressed and War Invalids) is the second-largest commercial enterprise in the country, behind the state-owned National Iranian Oil Co. Until recently it was run by a man named Mohsen Rafiqdoost. The son of a vegetable-and-fruit merchant at the Tehran bazaar, Rafiqdoost got his big break in 1979, when he was chosen to drive Ayatollah Khomeini from the airport after his triumphal return from exile in Paris.

Khomeini made him Minister of the Revolutionary Guards to quash internal dissent and smuggle in weapons for the Iran-Iraq war. In 1989, when Rafsanjani became president, Rafiqdoost gained control of the Mostazafan Foundation, which employs up to 400,000 workers and has assets that in all probability exceed $10 billion. Among its holdings: the former Hyatt and Hilton hotels in Tehran; the highly successful Zam-Zam soft drink company (once Pepsi); an international shipping line; companies producing oil products and cement; swaths of farmland and urban real estate.

اشاره به محسن رفیقدوست که کنترل بنیاد مستضعفان و جانبازان را در زمان ریاست جمهوری هاشمی در اختیار گرفت. این بنیاد 400 هزار نفر پرسنل و دارائی هایی به ارزش بیش از 10 ملیارد دلار دارد.

Theoretically the Mostazafan Foundation is a social welfare organization. By 1996 it began taking government funds to cover welfare disbursements; soon it plans to spin off its social responsibilities altogether, leaving behind a purely commercial conglomerate owned by--whom? That is not clear. Why does this foundation exist? "I don''''t know--ask Mr. Rafiqdoost," says Abbas Maleki, a foreign policy adviser to Ayatollah Rafsanjani.

A picture emerges from one Iranian businessman who used to handle the foreign trade deals for one of the big foundations. Organizations like the Mostazafan serve as giant cash boxes, he says, to pay off supporters of the mullahs, whether they''''re thousands of peasants bused in to attend religious demonstrations in Tehran or Hezbollah thugs who beat up students. And, not least, the foundations serve as cash cows for their managers.

"It usually works like this," explains this businessman. "Some foreigner comes in, proposes a deal to the foundation head. The big boss says: ‘Fine. I agree. Work out the details with my administrator. So the foreigner goes to see the administrator, who tells him: ‘You know that we have two economies here--official and unofficial. You have to be part of the unofficial economy if you want to be successful. So, you have to deposit the following amount into the following bank account abroad and then the deal will go forward.

Today Rafiqdoost heads up the Noor Foundation, which owns apartment blocks and makes an estimated $200 million importing pharmaceuticals, sugar and construction materials. He is quick to downplay his personal wealth. "I am just a normal person, with normal wealth," he says. Then, striking a Napoleonic pose, he adds: "But if Islam is threatened, I will become big again."

امروز رفیقدوست رئیس سازمان نور است. این سازمان مالک چندین واحد مسکونی است که وارد کننده دارو٬ شکر و ادوات ساخت و ساز با درآمدی به ارزش 200 میلیون دلار است.

Implication: that he has access to a secret reservoir of money that can be tapped when the need arises. That may have been what Ayatollah Rafsanjani had in mind when he declared recently that the Islamic Republic needed to keep large funds in reserve. But who is to determine when Islam is in danger?

As minister of the Revolutionary Guards in the 1980s, Rafiqdoost played a key role in sponsoring Hezbollah in Lebanon--which kidnapped foreigners, hijacked airplanes, set off car bombs, trafficked in heroin and pioneered the use of suicide bombers. According to Gregory Sullivan, spokesman for the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau at the U.S. State Department, the foundations are the perfect vehicles to carry out Iran''''s shadow foreign policy. (One of them offered the $2.8 million bounty to anyone who carried out Ayatollah Khomeini''''s fatwa to kill British author Salman Rushdie.) Whenever suspicion of complicity in a terrorist incident--in Saudi Arabia, Israel, Argentina--turns to Iran, the Tehran government has denied involvement. State Department officials suspect that such operations may be sponsored by one of the foundations and semiautonomous units of the Revolutionary Guards. If anyone in Iran is aiding al Qaeda, that may be the best place to look.

Iran''''s foundations are a law unto themselves. The largest "charity" (at least in terms of real estate holdings) is the centuries-old Razavi Foundation, charged with caring for Iran''''s most revered shrine--the tomb of Reza, the Eighth Shiite Imam, in the northern city of Mashhad. It is run by one of Iran''''s leading hard-line mullahs, Ayatollah Vaez-Tabasi, who prefers to stay out of the public eye but emerges occasionally to urge death to apostates and other opponents of the clerical regime.

The Razavi Foundation owns vast tracts of urban real estate all across Iran, as well as hotels, factories, farms and quarries. Its assets are impossible to value with any precision, since the foundation has never released an inventory of its holdings, but Iranian economists speak of a net asset value of $15 billion or more. The foundation also receives generous contributions from the millions of pilgrims who visit the Mashhad shrine each year.

بنیاد (آستان) رضوی صاحب وسیعترین املاک در سرتاسر ایران است. این املاک شامل هتلها کارخانه ها زمینهای کشاورزی و معادن می باشد.ارزش گذاری دقیق اموال و املاک این بنیاد کار بسیار دشورای است زیرا این بنیاد تاکنون هیچ گاه لیستی از داراییهای خود منتشر نکرده است. اقتصاد دانان ایران خالص دارائی های این بنیاد را 15 میلیارد دلار برآورد می کنند. علاوه براینها این بنیاد نذورات و اعانه های میلیونها زائر که هر سال به شهر مقدس مشهد سفر می کنند را هم جمع آوری می کند.

What happens to annual revenues estimated in the hundreds of millions--perhaps billions--of dollars? Not all of it goes to cover the maintenance costs of mosques, cemeteries, religious schools and libraries. Over the past decade the foundation has bought new businesses and properties, established investment banks (together with investors from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), funded real estate projects and financed big foreign trade deals.

The driving force behind the commercialization of the Razavi Foundation is Ayatollah Tabasi''''s son, Naser, who was put in charge of the Sarakhs Free Trade Zone, on the border with the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan. In the 1990s the foundation poured hundreds of millions of dollars into this project, funding a rail link between Iran and Turkmenistan, new highways, an international airport, a hotel and office buildings. It even paid $2.3 million to a Swiss firm to erect a huge tent for the ceremonies inaugurating the Iran-Turkmenistan rail link.

کنترل فعالیتهای آستان قدس رضوی و پیشبرد اهداف تجاری و بازرگانی این بنیاد در دست ناصر فرزند آیت الله طبسی است. مسئولیت پروژه منطقه آزاد تجاری سرخس به وی واگذار شد. در دهه 1990 چند صد میلیون دلار به این منطقه تزریق شده است. فقط مبلغ 2.3 میلیون دلار برای نصب چادر جشن افتتاح خط راه آهن ایران – ترکمنستان در آن زمان به یک شرکت سویسی پرداخت شد.

Then it all went wrong. In July 2001 Naser Tabasi was dismissed as director of the Free Trade Zone. Two months later he was arrested and charged with fraud in connection with a Dubai-based company called Al-Makasib. The details of the case remain murky, but four months ago the General Court of Tehran concluded that Naser Tabasi had not knownthat he was breaking the law and acquitted him.

در سال 2001 وی بدلایل نامعلوم از مسئولیت این منطقه آزاد کنار گذاشته شد و دوماه بعد به جرم کلاه برداری در رابطه با شرکت المکاسیب (دوبی) دستگیر شد. هیچ کس از جزئیات این کلاه برداری اطلاعی ندارد اما چهار ماه پیش دادگاه تهران به این دلیل که وی از قانون شکنی خود آگاه نبوده است او را آزاد کرد.

Few receive even a slap on the wrist. A rare exception: Hard-line cleric Hadi Ghaffari, who specialized in seizing expropriated properties, like Star Stockings (maker of sexy lingerie), and reselling them at a nice profit. He was convicted of embezzlement in the early 1990s.

کمتر کسی از این افراد حتی یک پشت دستی بعنوان تنبیه دریافت کرده است. یک استثنای نادر روحانی بسیار معتقد و متعصب هادی غفاری است. وی سه دوره نماینده مجلس شورای اسلامی بوده است و مهارت خاصی در تحت مالکیت درآوردن اموال منقوله و ضبط شده دارد. یکی از آنها تولیدی لباس زیر زنانه با مارک Star میباشد که وی را صاحب سود سرشاری نموده است. او در اویل دهه 1990 به اختلاس محکوم شد.

Iran''''s most distinguished senior clerics are disgusted by the mullahcrats. Ayatollah Taheri, Friday prayer leader of the city of Isfahan, resigned in protest earlier this year. "When I hear that some of the privileged progeny and special people, some of whom even don cloaks and turbans, are competing amongst themselves to amass the most wealth," he said, "I am drenched with the sweat of shame."

روحانیون و مراجع تقلید بزرگ در ایران بارها بیزاری خود را نسبت به این دسته از روحانیون سرمایه دار و سودجو اعلام کرده اند. آیت الله طاهری امام جمعه اصفهان به نشانه اعتراض به این وضعیت امسال استعفا داد. او می گوید وقتی به من خبر از سوء فعالیتهای بعضی افراد و فرزندان آنها با استفاده از امکانات بیت المال داده می شود خصوصا وقتی که می شنوم بعضی از آنها آقازاده های روحانیون بانفوذ مملکت هستند و در راه کسب ثروت با هم مسابقه گذاشته اند خیس از عرق شرم می شوم.

بر اثر سوء مدیریت همین روحانیون ملت ایران فقری را تجربه کرده اند که هیچ گاه لزومی به وجود آن نبوده است. با دارا بودن 9 درصد از ذخایر نفت جهان و 15 درصد گاز طبیعی جهان ایران می بایستی کشوری ثروتمند می بود. این کشور دارای یکی از بالاترین درصد جمعیت جوان تحصیل کرده و سابقه سنتی و قدیمی در تجارت جهانی و تولیدات صنایع دستی است. اما درآمد سرانه ملی به نسبت قبل از انقلاب 7 درصد کاهش داشته است. خیلی از تجار و صاحبان سرمایه در ایران ترجیح داده اند در خارج از این کشور به فعالیت بپردازند. 3 ملیارد دلار هزینه ای است که تخمین زده می شود این افراد برای پروازهای خود به خارج از کشور می پردازند تا بتوانند در محیطی امن به فعالیتهای اقتصادی خود بپردازند.

امیدوارم که خوندن این مقاله که مربوط به شش سال پیشه و توسط یک غیر ایرانی نوشته شده کمک کنه بتونیم حداقل بخشی از راه و فکری که احمدی نژاد در اون گام برداشته رو بفهمیم. البته اگر بتونیم در این راه کاری بکنیم که بزرگترین کمک رو به مملکت خودمون کردیم.

و در عین حال شاید کمک بکنه که بفهمیم دلیل حمایت این دسته از روحانیون و وابستگان و آقا زاده های اونها از کاندیداهای مخالف احمدی نژاد چی هست.